AFRICANEWS

Sudan

SPLA Ceasefire: Humanitarian or strategic?

Conflict

Sudan's main rebel group SPLA on July 15 declared a unilateral cease-fire to ease relief operations in the famine-stricken Bahr el-Ghazal province. The government quickly responded by agreeing to the same. Now pundits are questioning whether the move was humanitarian or strategic.

On July 15, representatives of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) in Nairobi announced that the SPLA had declared a three-month unilateral cease-fire in the on-going civil war in the Sudan. According to one of the representatives, Mr. Justin Yaac, the cease-fire applies only to the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal and parts of Upper Nile province towards the Ethiopian border. The announcement came as a relief to aid agencies struggling to ferry food to Bahr-el-Ghazal, the province worst hit by the famine. Aid agencies have also sounded warnings that despite some food getting to the needy in Bahr-el-Ghazal, it is hardly enough and a further two million people still face imminent starvation.

To pundits, the unilateral cease-fire came as no surprise. In January this year, a former SPLA renegade commander, who had earlier defected to the government side, re-defected to the SPLA in a rather dramatic move. Commander Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, while in the government army, proved to be a real obstacle to SPLA attempts to capture territory controlled by the government in Bahr-el-Ghazal province. A man best known for his prowess in the battlefield, Commander Kerubino wreaked havoc on the local population and forced many to flee their homes. Pundits believe that the famine in Bahr-el-Ghazal is in fact a direct result of Kerubino's atrocities on the civilian population.

If the defection of Kerubino was joy to the SPLA, to the government, it was a sign of sorrow. True to his military prowess, Kerubino did not just defect without causing a stir. In a three-day intensive battle with government forces, Kerubino captured most of Wau, the second largest two in southern Sudan after Juba. He only fled to the bush after his forces ran out of ammunition.

His defection also dealt a mighty blow to a peace agreement signed in April 1997 between the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), a coalition of splinter groups of the SPLA led by Riak Machar, and the Sudanese government. Kerubino was the second man to Riak Machar and his defection sparked the first signal on the vulnerability of the pact or the so called "peace from within" efforts of the government.
Although the unilateral declaration of cease-fire by the SPLA might appear to be in good faith for the benefit of the starving masses, the timing is quite questionable. In early May, prior to the start of the IGAD-sponsored peace talks in Nairobi, talk of a cease-fire by the SPLA was an anathema. While the government appeared ready to accommodate the idea of a cease-fire, the SPLA flatly refused claiming that Khartoum's call was a calculated attempt to give its troops a breather from a harsh and imminent SPLA offensive, and that it was designed to offset the military superiority the SPLA had that time. In Bahr-el-Ghazal, with Kerubino and his forces safely in the arms of the SPLA, the main obstacle seems to have been removed and most of Bahr-el-Ghazal came into SPLA hands.

In late May and early June in Blue Nile province, the SPLA went on the offensive and captured a series of garrisons including the strategic Ulu. The SPLA also advanced to within reach of Damazin, an important power supplying town to the Sudanese capital Khartoum. On July 14, government attempts to recapture Ulu suffered a mighty blow when about 273 soldiers were killed and forces numbering about 2,500 men dispersed.

In Equatoria province in the South towards Uganda, the government is pinned down in the heavily fortified garrison towns of Juba, Torit and Kapoeta. The SPLA is still 45 miles from Juba on the western front since the launch of operation "Thunderbolt" in late 1997, which saw the whole of central Equatoria fall to the SPLA.
In Upper Nile, the SPLA seems not to be keen on going on the offensive since it captured the strategically placed border post of Pibor in 1995. In northern Upper Nile, Machar's SSIM reigns supreme with help from the government.

Although pressure from the international community helped in steering the SPLA towards the cease-fire, the unilateral declaration comes at a time when the SPLA is at its zenith of strength, than at any other time in its 15 year history. It has well trained army and is better armed than before. This kind of superiority was last enjoyed in the late 80s and early 90s. With this superiority, the SPLA can afford the luxury of declaring a unilateral cease-fire.
But as expected, the cease-fire did not come without strings attached. At the press conference, the SPLA representatives maintained the "rights to protect the cease-fire". This means that if attacked, the SPLA reserves the right to fight back.

But apparently no hostilities are about to be seen in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile yet, as the government, in a bid to regain a long-lost credibility in the eyes of the international community, welcomed the move as a positive gesture and in turn declared a cease-fire.
In another comic twist in the bizarre saga of the Sudanese conflict, a rift seems to have appeared within the ranks, of the SSIM, the main splinter group of the SPLA that signed a peace deal with the
government in April 1997. On July 19, reports coming from the SSIM stronghold in northern Upper Nile talked of heavy fighting between the forces of Riak Machar and a renegade commander, Paulino Mateb. This brings out one question, what will become of the April 1997 peace agreement?

The peace agreement itself has been the subject of ridicule among Sudanese citizens and the international community at large. John Garang, leader of the SPLA called it "an experiment in political masturbation," and dismissed it as a farce. The agreement, among other things, recognises Islamic law as the "supreme law" of the country, something unacceptable to the SPLA. Observers of the conflict have long maintained that a peace deal without the participation of the SPLA is literally a "wild goose chase".

| CONTENTS | AFRICANEWS HOMEPAGE |

AFRICANEWS - Koinonia Media Centre, P.O. Box 8034, Nairobi, Kenya
tel/fax: +254.2.560385 (voice) - +254.2.576175 (fax-modem)
AFRICANEWS on line is by Koinonia Media Centre