Da: "Info-SELVAS" A: Oggetto: Bolivia: Cocaleros annunciano blocchi il 6 gennaio Data: mercoledì 18 dicembre 2002 13.47 Coca Growers Announce Blockades for January 6 -- Will Continue Dialogue Prepared by the Andean Information Network December 17, 2002 Following an open meeting of the Six Coca Growing Federations in the Chapare on December 5, coca growers announced that they will begin blockades on the 6th of January, but will continue to dialogue with Bolivian government officials. During the three hour meeting, coca grower leaders decided to reject the government’s “new coca policy.” They agreed to continue dialogue if the government agrees to discuss the modification of article 10 of Law 1008 to allow each Chapare family to grow half a hectare of coca (La Razón, 12/6/02). Chapare coca growers have stated that the blockades will include a wide spectrum of other groups, such as the Landless Movement, ex-political prisoners and debtors (La Razón, 12/6/02). However, these sectors, as well as coca growers in the La Paz Yungas region and the campesino Federation led by Felipe Quispe Huanca (Mallku) have declared that they will not participate in the blockades (La Razón 12/12/02). At this time, a portion of the COB (Bolivian Workers’ Union) is the only group that has declared it will participate in the blockades. Perhaps in response to the lack of commitment to participate by other sectors, coca grower leader Evo Morales has created a new agenda for the dialogue that prioritizes the demands of these other sectors as well. While the government is pushing for the dialogue to address solely the demands of coca growers, Morales has created a 10-point agenda that incorporates other themes of national interest, including capitalization, the international sale of natural gas, and laws that affect diverse social sectors (Los Tiempos 12/12/02). While Chapare coca growers have agreed to continue dialogue, many are doubtful that negotiations will lead to an agreement. Julio Salazar of the Isinuta union stated, “We don’t believe in the government. There is no hope for the dialogue because the government is following the United States’ orders, defending the interests of that country . . .” (Opinion 12/6/02). Similarly, Elsa Flores of the Mamoré Federation stated, “I believe that there should not be continued dialogue . . . the government has been trying to trick us the whole time; they will not give us answers. So now, the women with our children are going to blockade” (Opinion 12/6/02). The Government has maintained that it remains open to dialogue, but is prepared to deal with blockades. Minister of Defense, Freddy Teodovic, affirmed that the Ninth Division of the Army, located in the Chapare, has adequate forces to maintain order and control in the region, as well as forces of the Joint Task Force and UMOPAR (the rural antinarcotics police) (Opinion 12/6/02). He stated, “the number of forces that we have in the Chapare is a predetermined . . . The Ninth Division has between 1,200 and 1,500 men. We don’t see the need to increase this number in order to guarantee order in the region” (Opinion 12/6/02). During times of conflict, though, the government sends in military reinforcements from other areas. Coca Growers and Political Opposition Declare Alternative Development a Failure (Again) A continued source of desperation for coca growers is a lack of other viable economic options. As one producer of palm heart, stated, “I have decided to continue to plant coca, there is no other alternative. We have dedicated so much time and energy to growing palm heart but no one wants to buy it. We are suffering from hunger, we have no future for our children”(El Diario 12/9/02). Costs for starting alternative development crops can be prohibitively high. In the case of palm heart, the producer must initially invest 1000 dollars per hectare out of their own pocket, in spite of alternative development assistance. MAS party leader Evo Morales affirmed that corruption has hindered alternative development, “as only bureaucrats have benefited from resources allocated for alternative development projects” (El Diario 12/9/02). He stated, “the failure of alternative development is due to corruption, lack of markets, elevated costs of transportation and technical assistance that is more expensive than the income generated by tropical products”(El Diario 12/9/02). Senator of the MIR party, Morgan López, has assured that the government is taking seriously the possibility of reevaluating alternative development in order to correct what’s not working. He recognized that the government has not yet found an economically, ecologically and socially viable alternative to diminish economic dependency on the coca leaf (El Diario 12/9/02). NFR party member Johnny Antezana stated that the government “needs to create internal markets in order to assure the sale of alternative products” (El Diario 12/9/02). He admitted that tropical fruits that have been cultivated in the Chapare as an alternative to coca have had no success in a supersaturated market unable to compete globally. In response to the criticism that alternative development in the Chapare has been a failure, Presidential Spokesman Mauricio Antezana announced that the government is looking for ways to support economic development in the region. He stated that, “We want to incorporate the consumption of the banana into a school breakfast program for all children in the country. Other products will be added to the diet of police officers and military officers. This strategy will guarantee a secure market for alternative development.”(El Diario 12/9/02). After over twelve years of alternative development efforts, no strategy or plan has been able to guarantee market for these crops. Violence and Human Rights Violations Despite Dialogue Although negotiations have not broken down during the last three months, tensions in the Chapare remain high. Coca growers continued vigils around eradication camps and intermittent violence continued. The Chapare Human Rights Ombudsman’s office has documented 53 coca growers and three security officers injured and one coca grower and one navy conscript killed since Sanchez de Lozada’s August 6 inauguration. Press accounts sustain that another four soldiers have been injured. Dorado Chico Confrontation--August 27 In mid-July, the Joint Task Force (JTF) set up three eradication camps in the Dorado Chico, Dorado Grande and Ibuelo communities. According to eyewitnesses, at approximately 8:30 a.m. on August 27 in Dorado Chico, a large group of coca growers surrounded 100 members of the Joint Task Force (JTF), creating an incredibly tense situation. At the same time, members of the Ibuelo community denounced that JTF had fired tear gas into their homes and beat and detained several coca growers. The Human Rights Ombudsman’s office verified the beating of 12 people during the incident. The forensic specialist at the Justice and Human Rights Center certified that seven people suffered multiple contusions, one with a possible fractured rib, and one had an open head wound. Four of these men were detained. The Joint Task Force left the region several hours later. JTF Commander, Hernan Caprirolo agreed to remove the camp from the region. San Andres Conflict-- September 3 On August 30, the JTF transferred three camps from Ibuelo to San Andres, between the Chimore and Carrasco Tropical Federations. Several hundred coca growers immediately surrounded the camps, impeding eradication. On September 3, JTF troops tear-gassed coca growers around the Guadalupe camp. Ecological Police officer Silvestre Chinche Apaza suffered machete cuts to the ear and shoulder. Security forces detained coca grower, Fructuoso Apaza Arteaga and his wife, Antonia Rocha Perez, as a result. Rocha was released the same day. Fructuoso Apaza suffered three fractured ribs during his detention and has been transferred to Cochabamba for further legal investigation. Soldier Killed By Booby Trap October 4 On October 4, navy conscript Robin Huanacoma Huanama (18 years old) was fatally injured when he set off a booby trap bomb while eradicating coca in the San Marcos community near Chimore. Clash In Ichoa October 6 On Sunday October 6, approximately 200 members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) entered the Volcan community, near Entre Ríos. According to eyewitness accounts, when some members of the community attempted to block their access, a member of the force shot a coca grower. After this incident the JTF began to leave the region. When they reached the intersection of the road to Ichoa at approximately 10:15 members of the force began to fire tear gas and live ammunition at a small group of coca growers gathered in a vigil. Union leader Sabino Toledo (40 years old) received a bullet wound in the left pectoral muscle and died. The Ministry of Justice autopsy report documents the death. According to eyewitness accounts and reports from human rights monitors, although there was a great deal of tension, coca growers were unarmed and no confrontation took place. Four Soldiers Reportedly Injured by Booby Traps November 16 On the morning of November 16, four soldiers of the la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta (FTC) were injured by a booby trap explosion in the Alto San Pablo region, according to the Vice-minister of Social Defense, Ernesto Justiniano (El Diario 12/17/02). According to authorities, the explosive consisted of dynamite attached to a bottle containing nails, bolts and rocks, and it was activated electrically. The names of the victims have not been released. Impunity Update: The Ramón Pérez Case On September 27, 2001 a member of the Joint task force shot and killed Ramón Pérez, who was leading a group of journalists toward the Loma Alta military camp in the Chapare. Almost a year later, the Ivirgarzama civilian judge has granted a suspended sentence to one Ecological Police officer on duty during the incident. On the 26th of September, 2002, the judge found Macario Beltran Condori guilty of negligent homicide and gave him a three year suspended prison sentence. The judge gave Beltran two years of probation in which he is prohibited from changing residences without the permission of the judge and consuming alcoholic beverages, and during which he must check in with the judge every 45 days. As a result Beltran will serve no jail time. The ruling claims that a ballistic report that matches bullet shells found at the scene of the murder with bullets fired by this officer proves that the officer shot his weapon, making Beltran responsible for the death. However, the bullets that killed Ramon Pérez were not identified or examined, and Beltran was among several security officers to shoot at the group of journalists. Therefore, matching the bullet shell with the officer is not conclusive evidence. Initial reports written by police officers participating in the incident did not include this particular soldier. The judge’s ruling also claims that the officers could not hear the yells of the journalists, which identified them as journalists and not aggressors, due to background motor noise. The reenactment of events held approximately a month before the decision established that the camp’s guards had a clear view of the small, unarmed group of journalists and Perez approaching. The Pérez case represents the first time in the Chapare that a judge has completed a case against a security officer for a human rights violation. This process appears to represent a new strategy to avoid concrete legal consequences for human rights violators, as criticism for these trials in military courts continues. The abbreviated trial process with multiple irregularities in terms of evidence and legal argumentation was called by one embassy official, “kind of a slap on the wrist.” Yet embassy officers remain reticent to evaluate whether the Bolivian government is “taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice,” a key requirement for Leahy Amendment implementation. Renewed Focus on Interdiction Government Dissemination of Misleading Information The United States Embassy has announced that the War on Drugs will begin to focus more on interdiction as a means of halting drug production. Since the implementation of Plan Dignidad in 1998, the great bulk of antidrug efforts focused on forced eradication. While interdiction, carried out with respect for human rights and legal norms, is a more viable means of stopping drug production than eradicating the coca leaf, misinformation about the effectiveness of interdiction operations continues to be a problem. An example of this new focus on interdiction is “Operation Falcon” which took place in November 2002. Bolivian government officials announced that in this operation, the anti-drug police (UMOPAR) confiscated 152 kilos of cocaine base paste, destroyed 267 maceration pits and 204 factories, and detained 37 people involved in cocaine production in the Chapare region (El Diario 12/20/02). However, records at the Chimore antidrug holding cell demonstrated that there was no substantial increase in detentions during Operation Falcon, and that there continued to be an average of 2-3 detainees a week. In addition to misleading information regarding interdiction, Bolivian government officials consistently misrepresent the realities of the Drug War in the region, exacerbating coca growers’ frustrations. According to experts in the Chapare, the official figure of 11,000 hectares eradicated in 2002 is exaggerated. Coca growers consistently denounce that DIRECO (the government agency responsible for overseeing eradication) counts eradicated hectares that had very few coca plants the same as full hectares of coca in an effort to inflate eradication numbers and promote their efficiency. DIRECO officials counter that they estimate the density of coca planted in each hectare. However, a recent DIRECO document reported 50 percent density almost across the board, provoking speculation about the accuracy of these calculations. In addition, although a U.S. embassy presentation, based on satellite images, stated that there had been an increase of approximately 29 percent in Chapare coca cultivation between June 2001-2002 (La Razón 10/2/02, Unofficial translation of the presentation on estimated coca cultivation in Bolivia), a DIRECO official admitted that satellite data was not reliable, and that they “didn’t really know” how much coca remained in the region. Chapare residents continue to complain that the Joint Task Force destroys alternative crops and seedlings during eradication missions. Within the Chapare, government agencies continue to be engaged in an aggressive public relations campaign to promote the continued presence of security forces there. Until mid-November, local television and radio stations frequently broadcasted spots highlighting the civic action programs carried out by the Joint and Expeditionary Task Forces, even after the ETF had been disbanded. This propaganda provokes the outrage of local communities. Confirmation of David Greenlee as US Ambassador Sparks Controversy David Greenlee was confirmed as US Ambassador to Bolivia on November 14, 2002, and should arrive in the country in mid-January. According to his official biography, David N. Greenlee has been United States Ambassador to the Republic of Paraguay since July 2000. Greenlee has served at the U.S. embassy in La Paz before, as political officer and Deputy Chief of Mission from 1987-89. Prior to his confirmation, members of the MAS party staged a campaign against the new Ambassador, and MAS president Evo Morales was one of the most outspoken critics of this nomination. Morales stated, “The presence of David Greenlee in Bolivia is a clear demonstration of what the United States is trying to achieve in our country. We must bring the people together to defend our dignity and the few resources that we have left in our country” (El Diario, 10/2/02). The naming of David Greenlee as U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia brought on a review of his presence as an embassy official in Bolivia during times of conflict. One alternative press account accused Greenlee of “undiplomatic activities” during the Huanchaca incident in 1986 and the Villa Tunari massacre in 1988, as well participation in the creation of antidrug Law 1008. The article stated that “aggressive violations of human rights have been the dominant method in the antidrug policy led by Greenlee….. His has been a strategy clearly oriented to provoke reactions from the coca growers which the U.S. has then used as evidence of ‘narcoterrorism.’” (El Juguete Rabioso, 9/27/02). Other sources have not confirmed these accusations. Greenlee’s term as ambassador will most likely not mark a dramatic change in U.S. drug policy in Bolivia. During his October 9 confirmation hearing, Greenlee stated, “We have a [drug] policy that has worked. It has eliminated 70 percent of Bolivian coca; that policy should continue…we should see what we can do to make the policy better.” Greenlee stated that the policy has “spawned opposition” and “that there will probably continue to be excessive use of force due to the nature of confrontations. In those cases there must be investigations.” The new ambassador should present a slightly more diplomatic stance than his predecessor, Manuel Rocha. It remains to be seen how his arrival, about a week after blockades announced for January 6, will affect the negotiations and brewing conflict.