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PeaceLink 1997
MEMORANDUM
TO: THE PEOPLE AND PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
FROM: PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. BOYLE
SUBJECT: THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
DATE: NOVEMBER 30, 1995
DEAR FRIENDS:
Introduction
1. I have now had the opportunity to study the Dayton
documents. It is clear that Bosnia will lose 49% of its territory
to the Serb aggressor forces. Even worse, however, the 30% of
Bosnia now under control of the Government and the Armija will
effectively cede its independence to NATO. NATO will become a
belligerent occupation force that will be totally in control of
the land where it is stationed. I can see why you might be
prepared to give away 49% of Bosnia that you do not control. But
I cannot understand why you would want to give away to NATO the
30% of Bosnia that you do control. In essence, the 30% of Bosnia
that you do control will become the ward of NATO. You will have
absolutely no independence at all. The NATO commander will have
absolute dictatorial powers and the military force necessary to
back up his decisions. The President, the Presidency and the
Government will become nothing more than a puppet regime that will
have to do whatever NATO tells them to do.
2. Thus, after all these years, after all of your suffering,
after all you have accomplished, you will be effectively
surrendering 49% of your territory to the Serbs, 20% of your
territory to Tudjman, and 30% of your territory to NATO. Of
course this decision is for you to make, not me. But your Army
was not defeated in battle. It controls 30% of the territory of
Bosnia. It makes absolutely no sense for the Army to surrender to
NATO under the terms of the Dayton Agreement. These conclusions
become clear from an analysis of the following elements of the
Dayton Agreement:
Proximity Peace Talks, Wright-Patterson Airforce Base, Dayton,
Ohio, November 1-21, 1995
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
3. The General Framework Agreement refers to "the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia," not the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro). This is yet another concession to the
rump Yugoslavia that basically implies that the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is the successor-in-law to the former Yugoslavia.
4. Article I already refers to "Bosnia and Herzegovina"
instead of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears
from this phraseology that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
will give way to something called "Bosnia and Herzegovina." In
other words, the Serbs will have accomplished their objectives of
dissolving the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while obtaining
formal recognition of Republika Srpska.
5. Article III explicitly refers to Republika Srpska. This
has been another Serb objective all along, to obtain formal
recognition of Republika Srpska.
6. Article V. It is a bit strange and unprecedented for the
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
"fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made" in
the new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words,
Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia have basically been made
guarantors for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
is similar to what happened in Cyprus, where Turkey, Britain and
Greece were guarantors. Of course the war ensued.
7. Article X says that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina "recognize each other
as sovereign independent states within their international
borders." Yet, this language does not constitute formal
diplomatic recognition. This can only be done by means of the two
governments exchanging ambassadors with each other. This is
confirmed by the next language found in Article X: "Further
aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent
discussions." Hence there is still not the establishment of
formal diplomatic relations between the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I doubt very
seriously that Milosevic will ever exchange Ambassadors with, and
thus formally recognize, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which will be dissolved under the terms of the Dayton Agreement.
8. Article XI. The fact that this Agreement enters into
force upon signature simply indicates that Holbrooke decided to
ram it through immediately and then present it as a fait accompli
to the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Annexes
Annex 1-A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace
Settlement
Article I. General Obligations
9. Obviously this Agreement attempts to treat NATO as if it
were a "regional organization and arrangement" within the meaning
of Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter. But NATO is clearly
not this. Rather, NATO is a collective self-defense arrangement
organized under Article 51 of the Charter, which falls within
Chapter 6. NATO has no authority under the terms of the United
Nations Charter or the NATO Pact to engage in some type of
international peace enforcement operation as described herein.
10. Arguably the United Nations Organization has authority
to set up a peacekeeping operation such as UNPROFOR. But NATO
does not.
11. 2(a). "Neither Entity shall threaten or use force
against the other Entity, and under no circumstances shall any
armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within the
territory of the other Entity without the consent of the
government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina." In other words, the Bosnian Armija cannot attack
the Srpska Army under any circumstances.
12. 3. "Both Entities shall be held equally responsible for
compliance herewith..." In other words, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska are being treated as if they
were de facto independent states. The Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is nowhere to be found here.
Article II. Cessation of Hostilities
Article III. Withdrawal of Foreign Forces
13. This seems to require the withdrawal of military forces
of the Republic of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia within thirty
days. And yet the Republic of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia are
not parties to this Annex. Rather, the only parties to this Annex
are the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska. But there are
side letters to that effect which will be discussed below.
Article IV. Redeployment of Forces
14. There is established here a zone of separation between
the forces that is four kilometers wide, that is two kilometers on
either side of an agreed cease-fire line. Only IFOR is permitted
in this agreed cease-fire zone of separation. In other words,
this is a de facto carve-up of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina along the cease-fire line that will be policed by
IFOR.
III. Phase II, page 7
15. Here the document refers to "Inter-Entity Boundary
Line". So it is clear that they are talking about a boundary line
here. In other words, once again, both Entities are being treated
as if they were de facto states requiring the demarcation of a
boundary line.
16. 4. General, page 8. Notice here that IFOR will
demarcate the boundary line between the two Entities. So, once
again, you have NATO/IFOR formally demarcating a border, thus
creating two de facto independent states.
V. Phase III, page 9
17. 6. "...the IFOR has the right and is authorized to
compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces
and weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities in,
any location in Bosnia and Herzegovina..." In other words, IFOR
is going to run the entire country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
rest of paragraph 6 gives IFOR the right to use military force
toward that end.
18. Basically, therefore, IFOR will be in charge of the
entire country, with the right to use military force anywhere it
wants. It is hard to see what will be left then of the formal
independence of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, let
alone the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Article VI. Deployment of the Implementation Force, page 11
19. The Security Council is supposed to establish IFOR
acting under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which deals
with enforcement action. Nevertheless, NATO still has no
authority or competence to do this. Rather, it is simply a
collective self-defense arrangement organized under Article 51,
which is in Chapter 6.
20. 3. IFOR can be called upon to assist the conduct of
free and fair elections, to assist humanitarian organizations, to
deal with refugees, etc. Page 12. In other words, it appears
that IFOR will be drawn in to provide the military muscle
necessary to do everything else in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This
is directly contradictory to what Clinton is saying publicly about
the limited role of NATO.
21. 5. Basically, the IFOR commander can do whatever he
wants in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And paragraph 6 gives him the
right to use military force. In other words, all of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is going to be run by IFOR.
22. Page 13. Basically, IFOR will become the belligerent
occupant of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with all the rights,
privileges, and immunities thereof. And the IFOR commander has
the right to use military force basically at his discretion.
23. Under these conditions, therefore, I do not understand
how IFOR cannot get involved in so-called nation-building in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24. Basically, under the terms of this Agreement, NATO will
become the belligerent occupant of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
will therefore have the obligation under the Hague Regulations to
maintain law and order. Consequently, the Bosnian government will
be giving up whatever independence it currently exercises over the
30% of Bosnian territory that it now controls, as well as
permanently surrendering away control over the 49% of Bosnian
territory assigned to Republika Srpska. Under these
circumstances, the President, the Presidency and the Parliament
will become nothing more than a puppet regime that will have to do
whatever ordered by IFOR.
Article VIII. Establishment of a Joint Military Commission
25. It seems to me that the Joint Military Commission will
become the de facto government of Bosnia. Notice, however, that
the Commission shall function as nothing more than a consultative
body for the IFOR commander. Therefore, the IFOR commander runs
all of Bosnia for all intents and purposes.
Article XII. Final Authority to Interpret
26. Basically, the IFOR commander has the legal authority to
do whatever he wants to do. So in essence this Agreement is
setting up a military dictatorship in Bosnia under the control of
the IFOR commander.
Appendix B to Annex 1-A: Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Organization (NATO)
Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel
27. Basically, NATO personnel will be immune from the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for
whatever they might do. This NATO operation will be a law unto
itself.
Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Concerning the Status of NATO and its
Personnel
28. I have not read this document.
Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Concerning Transit
Arrangements for Peace Plan Operations
29. I have not read this document.
Annex 1-B: Agreement on Regional Stabilization
30. This Agreement is between the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika
Srpska.
Article II(i)
31. Notice that this only talks about a military liaison
mission between the chiefs of the armed forces of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. In other
words, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
disappears. And the Armies of the Federation and Srpska are
treated as Armies of de facto independent states. There is no
joint command, only coordination, which will never happen.
32. Article IV, page 4. These arms ratios are totally
inequitable. Basically, the rump Yugoslavia will have 75% plus
the 10% given to Republika Srpska for a grand total of 85% of the
baseline. The Republic of Croatia will have 30% of the baseline,
whereas the Federation will have 20% of the baseline. I do not
see how these ratios can create a stable peace in Bosnia or in the
Balkans.
Annex 2. Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related
Issues.
33. The establishment of an inter-entity boundary line
between the Federation and Srpska will probably become permanent.
Article V. Arbitration for the Brcko Area
34. Basically this puts the Brcko area on ice for the next
year. Again, the whole purpose of this Dayton Agreement was for
Clinton to get something in writing so that he could put the whole
Bosnia issue on ice for the next year in order to move forward
with his presidential election campaign without interference.
35. Also, right now I think it might be unlikely for the
President of the International Court of Justice to appoint a third
arbitrator when Bosnia has a case pending before the World Court
against the rump Yugoslavia. Of course if and when Bosnia is
forced to withdraw this lawsuit, then perhaps the President of the
Court might be willing to discharge this obligation. They should
have provided for some other alternative here besides the ICJ
President.
Annex 3. Agreement on Elections
36. Page 2. Quite frankly I do not see how there can be
real elections within nine months after entry into force of this
Agreement under the current conditions. This requirement is a
joke. All the Pale Serbs have to do is stall. The elections will
never go forward in Republika Srpska in accordance with these
requirements and under these conditions.
Article III. The Provisional Election Commission
37. It is for the Commission to impose penalties "against
any person or body that violates such provisions." But obviously
this means nothing without IFOR enforcement.
Article IV. Eligibility
38. "By Election Day, the return of refugees should already
be underway, thus allowing many to participate in person in
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina." This is a ridiculous
statement. How can anyone take this at face value.
39. There is absolutely no way anyone is going to be able to
organize democratic elections in Bosnia within the next ten
months.
Annex 4. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
40. Continuation. It does appear from the language used
here that the continuity of the state as an international legal
person will continue, including Bosnia's membership in the United
Nations Organization. Of course the Serbs will be able to claim
that "the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" no longer exists and
that this Agreement explicitly recognizes Republika Srpska. But
unlike previous versions, this language appears to protect the
legal existence of the State and its U.N. membership. The first
draft language given by Holbrooke to President Izetbegovic on 5
November 1995 would have dissolved the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a state under international law. So much for his
good faith. It was just as bad as what Owen tried to do at the
Owen-Stoltenberg negotiations.
41. Article III. Responsibilities of and Relations Between
the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities.
Obviously, Defense is omitted from this list on purpose.
Therefore, the central institutions will have no competence to
deal with matters related to the defense of the State. Therefore,
under paragraph 3, below, the two entities have responsibility for
"defense". Hence, the two entities--the Federation and Srpska--
will become de facto independent states.
42. Effectively, then, the institutions of the currently-
existing Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will go out of
existence, and a limited number of institutions with limited
competence might take their place. All other institutions must be
agreed upon by Republika Srpska, which will never happen.
43. Article IV. Parliamentary Assembly. The House of
Peoples will never work here because the Serb Delegates from
Republic Srpska will simply absent themselves as a block on
instructions from Pale.
44. Since the Pale Serbs can veto the operations of the
House of Peoples, then they can also veto the operations of the
Parliamentary Assembly.
45. Since the Pale Serbs can order their delegates to the
House of Peoples to absent themselves, there will never be a
quorum in the House of Peoples. Since there will never be a
quorum, the House of Peoples cannot act lawfully, and therefore
the Parliamentary Assembly cannot act lawfully. Thus nothing will
get done against the wishes of the Pale Serbs.
46. These other provisions do not change the situation.
Since the Pales Serbs have the right to prevent quorum, then no
business can be transacted at all against their wishes.
47. Once again, by voting as a block, the delegates or
members from Republika Srpska can effectively prevent any business
from being transacted by the Parliamentary Assembly against their
wishes.
48. Paragraph 4. Powers. Notice that the Parliamentary
Assembly does not have the competence to actually levy, raise, or
appropriate taxes or revenues. It can only do the "deciding upon
the sources and amounts of revenues for the operations... ." In
other words, it has no independent source of income. For this
reason, it will be completely meaningless. It will be very
similar to the first Articles of Confederation here in America
that failed precisely for this reason. It was replaced by the
Constitution of the United States of America that gave the Federal
Congress the right to raise money by means of taxation, duties,
imposts, etc. Without the power to tax, this Parliamentary
Assembly will have no effective powers at all.
49. Article V. Presidency. Section 2(d) effectively gives
the Pale Serbs a veto power over the operations of the Presidency.
In other words, the Presidency will be able to do nothing against
their wishes. It simply will not be able to operate.
50. Thus the Pale Serbs will even be able to prevent the
Presidency from conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Therefore, even that limited competence can be
effectively forestalled by the Pale Serbs.
5. Standing Committee
51. Under this provision, the Bosniac member of the
Presidency has control over the Bosnian Armija. The Croat member
of the Presidency has the control over the HVO. And the Serb
member of the Presidency has control over the Srpska Army. It
does not appear that there will be any type of joint command or
general staff for these three armies. Thus, the Srpska Army will
remain intact as it currently is. If so, then that would
undermine the paper guarantee of refugees and displaced persons to
return to their homes. Why would a Bosniac or a Croat want to
return to their homes under the occupation of the Srpska Army that
is being commanded by the successors to Mladic and Karadzic? That
refugee would have to be insane.
52. The rest of the language in 5(a) guarantees the de facto
partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
53. The Standing Committee on Military Matters only has
authority "to coordinate," not to command. Therefore, the three
armies (Armija, HVO, Srpska) will remain intact as is.
Article VI. Constitutional Court
54. This so-called protection in here giving the
Constitutional Court the jurisdiction to decide on a "special
parallel relationship" will not help. The Constitutional Court
would certainly have to permit a "special parallel relationship"
between Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia that is
identical to the Confederation Agreement between the Republic of
Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the
conclusion of such a Confederation Agreement between Republika
Srpska and the Republic of Serbia will be tantamount to a de
facto, but not de jure, absorption of Republika Srpska by the
Republic of Serbia. In other words, you will have a de facto, but
not de jure, Greater Serbia that would include 49% of the
territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
55. It is also clear that the Constitutional Court has no
authority to interfere when the Pale Serbs absent themselves so as
to prevent the establishment of a quorum in the House of Peoples.
Thus, there is no way the Constitutional Court can force the House
of Peoples and therefore the Parliamentary Assembly to function
and operate against the wishes of the Pale Serbs.
Article VII. The Central Bank
56. This provision provides that the Central Bank's
responsibility "will be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly."
But since the Pale Serbs have a veto power over the operations of
the Parliamentary Assembly, this Central Bank will never be able
to do anything effectively. That is made clear by the next
sentence which makes it clear that the Central Bank cannot for a
period of six years "extend credit by creating money." And it can
only get that authority when expressly granted by the
Parliamentary Assembly, which will never occur because of the Pale
Serb veto power. Thus there will be a Central Bank in name only.
Article VIII. Finances
57. Basically, the Parliamentary Assembly will have no
effective authority to raise revenue against the wishes of the
Pale Serbs. Likewise, the Pale Serbs will simply refuse to
provide the required one-third of the revenue of the Parliamentary
Assembly. The fact that the Parliamentary Assembly must rely upon
the Federation and Republic Srpska for its revenue is a fatal
defect here. Once again, it is similar to the arrangement under
the American Articles of Confederation whereby the Central
Government had to rely upon the States to provide revenues to it.
They never did it, which is why the Articles were replaced by the
U.S. Constitution.
Article XII. Entry Into Force
58. "1. This Constitution shall enter into force upon
signature of the General Framework Agreement as a constitutional
act amending and superseding the Constitution of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina." This procedure is obviously
unconstitutional under the current Constitution of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, this new Constitution is not even
required to be submitted to the Parliament of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. For all intents and purposes, this new
Constitution has come into effect immediately in accordance with
its terms without the approval of the Parliament of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and without following the amendment
procedure in the current Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In other words, under the terms of this
Constitution, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its
Parliament, and all its institutions have basically gone out of
existence as of November 22, 1995. That is the reason why they
got rid of the name "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" in
Article I.
Annex II. Transitional Arrangements
1. Joint Interim Commission
59. Notice here that the "Parties" established the Joint
Interim Commission to implement the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. But the Parties are the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Why should Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia have
anything to say about the implementation of the Constitution for
Bosnia and Herzegovina?
4. Offices
60. It appears that this language allows for the
continuation of "governmental offices, institutions, and other
bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to operate "in accordance with
applicable law" until superseded. Notice, however, that these
offices and institutions are no longer operating in accordance
with the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Also, it is not clear that this transitional provision would apply
to the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
title "offices" would not seem to include Parliament itself.
Annex 5. Agreement on Arbitration
61. Basically, this Agreement requires arbitration between
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has nothing to do with it.
Therefore, pursuant to this Agreement, the Federation and Srpska
are being treated as if they were de facto independent states.
Annex 6. Agreement on Human Rights
62. Article I treats the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska as if they were de facto
independent states with obligations under international human
rights treaties.
63. Article III(2): "The salaries and expenses of the
Commission and its staff shall be determined jointly by the
parties and shall be borne by Bosnia and Herzegovina." In other
words, the Pale Serbs have a veto power over the operation of the
Commission. Hence I doubt very seriously that this Commission
will ever come into existence. Moreover, it is clear that the
salaries and expenses will not be paid for by the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Rather, it says they
will be paid for by "Bosnia and Herzegovina," which cannot
generate its own revenue. If they were serious about the
Commission, they would require the expenses to be paid for by the
Federation and Republika Srpska.
64. So this entire Annex on Human Rights Implementation and
Machinery looks fine on paper. But since there is no provision
for effective financing, I doubt very seriously that it will ever
come into effective and meaningful operation.
Annex 7. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
65. Article I. This says nothing at all about who will be
responsible for paying compensation to refugees for "any property
that cannot be restored to them."
Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees
66. "2. The salaries and expenses of the Commission and its
staff shall be determined jointly by the Parties and shall be
borne equally by the Parties." So here it is required that the
Federation and Republika Srpska pay the expenses, as opposed to
"Bosnia and Herzegovina" which is the case for the Human Rights
Commission. Nevertheless, these matters must be "determined
jointly by the Parties." In other words, the Pale Serbs have been
given a veto power over the establishment and operation of the
Commission. Hence, I doubt very seriously that it will ever be
able to operate effectively.
67. Article XII(2). The Commission has the power to award
"just compensation as determined by the Commission." But there is
no effective mechanism here for this compensation to be paid. For
example, there is no requirement that the Federation or especially
Republika Srpska pay such compensation. If this provision were to
have any meaning, clearly Republika Srpska would be required to
pay "just compensation" for all the property it has destroyed.
68. Paragraph 6. This language about compensation bonds
means nothing. There is no obligation here by anyone to honor
these compensation bonds.
69. Article XIV. Property Fund. Once again, there is no
fixed capital contribution for this Fund. So I doubt very
seriously that anything will come of it, let alone the so-called
compensation bonds.
70. Basically, this Fund will depend upon grants from the
international community.
Annex 8. Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments
71. Article III: "The salaries and expenses of the
Commission and its staff shall be determined jointly by the
Entities and shall be borne equally by them." In other words,
once again the Pale Serbs have a veto power over the function of
this Commission. So it probably will never get off the ground.
72. This is a joke and a half that Republika Srpska has
agreed to protect national monuments when in fact it has done
everything possible to destroy them throughout Bosnia. This Annex
is the height of hypocrisy and absurdity.
Annex 9. Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Public Corporations
73. In the Preamble, notice that the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is no longer even mentioned. Under the new regime,
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will disappear. Hence, the
Federation and Republika Srpska are being treated as if they were
de facto independent states here.
74. Article II(5). "Within 30 days after this Agreement
enters into force, the Parties shall agree on sums of money to be
contributed to the Transportation Corporation for its initial
budget. ..." In other words, once again, the Pale Serbs have a
veto power over the operation of this Transportation Corporation,
which means that it will probably never come into effective
operation. This is nothing more than a mere paper corporation.
75. Article III. Other Public Corporations. This Article
is the height of cynicism. Effectively it recognizes that the
only public corporation set up was the transportation corporation,
which is only on paper. There is not even an obligation to set up
any other types of public corporations to deal with utilities,
energy, post and communications. The establishment of these
public corporations is subject to the veto power of the Pale
Serbs, so they will never be set up.
Annex 10. Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace
Settlement
76. Article V. Final Authority to Interpret. "The High
Representative is the final authority in the theater regarding
interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of
the peace settlement." In other words, the High Representative
will basically run Bosnia and Herzegovina as he or she sees fit
with respect to non-military matters. IFOR will have the power
and authority to do whatever it wants with respect to military
matters. Hence, there will be no real sovereign authority or
control left to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any of
the Central Authorities for "Bosnia and Herzegovina." The
President, the Presidency, the Government, and the Parliament will
constitute merely a puppet regime devoid of any real independence
from NATO.
Annex 11. Agreement on International Police Task Force
77. Under this Annex it appears that the United Nations
Organization is basically going to take over and assume
supervisory jurisdiction for all domestic law enforcement
activities within Bosnia. Therefore, the Bosnian government will
basically lose control over this attribute of State sovereignty as
well.
Agreement on Initialling the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia
Letter by Granic to Kinkel, November 21, 1995
78. Notice that in this letter the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina no longer exists. Granic for Croatia does not agree
to respect "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of" the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
79. The same applies to the other letters by him.
Letter by Milutinovic to Kinkel of 21 November 1995
80. Notice that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not
agree to respect "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of" the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The same applies to the other letters by him.
81. Concerning the letter by Granic to Boutros Ghali of 21
November 1995, I doubt very seriously that the Republic of Croatia
"shall strictly refrain from introducing into or otherwise
maintaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina any armed forces or other
personnel with military capability." The undoubted violation of
this Agreement would arguably create a material breach of the
Dayton Agreement that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina could
rely upon to pull out of the Dayton Agreement. The same argument
applies to Granic's other letters to the same effect.
82. Concerning the letter by Milutinovic to Boutros Ghali of
21 November 1995, I doubt very seriously that "the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia shall strictly refrain from introducing
into or otherwise maintaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina any armed
forces or other personnel with military capability." Arguably,
the breach of this commitment, which undoubtedly will occur, will
be a material breach of the entire Dayton Agreement that would
give justification to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for
pulling out of this Agreement. The same rationale would apply to
the other letters by Milutinovic to that effect.
Letter by Izetbegovic to Christopher, November 21, 1995 on
Confidence Building Measures
83. Notice that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no
longer exists.
Milosevic Letter to Christopher of November 21, 1995
84. Notice that he does not undertake any obligation to
develop confidence building measures between the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
85. Notice also that the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations are not called for by this Agreement, which would
require the exchange of Ambassadors between the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed,
this Agreement does not even call for the exchange of Ambassadors
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and "Bosnia and
Herzegovina." So in other words, Milosevic has not even
recognized "Bosnia and Herzegovina," let alone the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, there is no good reason for him
to do so since the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will go out
of legal existence and Bosnia and Herzegovina will no longer
function as a unified State. So why should he recognize them? He
has gotten what he wanted, including half of Bosnia.
Security Council Resolution 1021 (1995)
86. Notice that in the second preambular clause there is no
longer any reference to preserving the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
87. Notice also that in the third preambular clause it
refers directly to "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" instead of
to "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."
88. The phraseology of these two preambular paragraphs are
significant victories for the rump Yugoslavia. In other words,
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina disappears, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia becomes the successor-in-law to the former
Yugoslavia.
89. Notice that under paragraph 1(b) the embargo on the
delivery of heavy weapons, ammunition therefor, mines, military
aircraft and helicopters "shall continue to be prohibited until
the arms control agreement referred to in Annex 1b has taken
effect..." In other words, the delivery of heavy weapons to the
Bosnian government will still be prohibited indefinitely. So the
real thrust of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government
will continue into force. So the Bosnian Army still cannot obtain
the heavy weapons it needs to defend its People and their Land.
90. Subparagraph (c) is so loaded with conditions that I
doubt very seriously that the heavy arms embargo against the
Bosnian government will ever terminate. It is completely
meaningless.
91. So under this resolution, the arms embargo on heavy
weapons against the Bosnian government will stay in effect
indefinitely. There is no commitment to a date certain that that
arms embargo against heavy weapons will ever terminate.
Security Council Resolution 1022 (1995)
92. Notice that in the second preambular paragraph, the
traditional reference to preserving the territorial integrity and
political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
has disappeared.
93. Notice that in the fourth preambular paragraph, there is
no longer a reference to "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)," but rather simply to "the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia." In other words, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia is being treated as if it were the successor-in-law to
the former Yugoslavia despite the General Assembly resolution and
action to the contrary.
94. Once again, these language changes are significant
victories for Milosevic. In other words, Milosevic got his way at
the Security Council as well as at Dayton.
95. Under paragraph 1, therefore, the economic sanctions
against the rump Yugoslavia "are suspended indefinitely with
immediate effect..." Thus, whereas the arms embargo against the
Bosnian government with respect to heavy weapons continues into
effect indefinitely, the rump Yugoslavia gets economic sanctions
against it suspended immediately on an indefinite basis, though
subject to provisions "of paragraphs 2 to 5 below." So in other
words, Milosevic gets everything he wants and the Bosnians get
nothing but a promise in the future. This is a real piece of
dirty work by the Security Council.
96. The provisions keeping sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs
mean nothing since the whole source of leverage was over Milosevic
and Serbia.
97. Paragraph 5 of the resolution basically frees up the
frozen Serb assets held around the world for Milosevic to go
after.
Conclusion
98. The above comments speak for themselves and require no
further elaboration from me. It is for you to decide where to go
from here, whether to accept the Dayton Agreement or reject it.
In the event you decide to reject the Dayton Agreement, then I am
fully prepared to return to the World Court immediately for the
purpose of obtaining an official order against this carve-up of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the purpose of
breaking the heavy weapons arms embargo against the Bosnian Armija
that will still continue in effect for quite some time. I cannot
decide this matter for you. It is your future that is at stake.
It is your State. It is your Destiny. It will be your Children
and Grandchildren who will have to live with this decision.
May God always be with you.
Your friend,
Francis A. Boyle
Professor of International Law
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