A piece of blatant racism and stupidity

Tuesday, 4 May 1999 : A piece of blatant racism and stupidity

(10:22 p.m.)

Dear Sabrina,

I've just talked to you and promised to send this piece of blatant racism
and stupidity.  Still, I wanted you to make sure what kind of people
inhibit this unfortunate planet... Oh, I am not saying they exist only in
the good ole USA, the likes of them can be found anywhere.  Let's just
steer clear of them...

Love,
Djordje

PS:  Still waiting for them.  May God be with us.

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On 05/04/99, at 10:26 AM, David Peterson wrote:

>Dear Prof. Vidanovic:
>
>    Per Noam Chomsky's request, I'm forwarding along a copy of Stacy
>Sullivan's article "Milosevic's Willing Executioners" (New Republic, May
>10--see below).
>    Feel free to let me know of any other material that I might find and
>forward along to you.
>
>Sincerely Yours,
>David Peterson
>
>************************
>
>The New Republic
>MAY 10, 1999
>SECTION: Pg. 26
>HEADLINE: Milosevic's Willing Executioners
>BYLINE: Stacy Sullivan
>
>HIGHLIGHT:
>Maybe we do have a quarrel with the Serbian people.
>
>In the spring of 1996, as eastern Bosnia's frozen ground was beginning to
>thaw, a photographer and I drove to Kamenica, a village in Republika
Srpska,
>the Serb-run enclave that was carved out of Bosnia by Serbian ethnic
>cleansing and later given juridical existence by the 1995 Dayton peace
>accord. We had been told that Kamenica was the place where Bosnian Serb
>forces had killed many of the 7,000 Bosnian Muslims who were missing after
>the Serbs overran the U.N.-protected enclave of Srebrenica the previous
>summer.
>
>We veered off the main road through the village onto a dirt path that led
>into rolling green hills. A few minutes later, we found ourselves standing
>on a grassy hillside littered with human bones. Nearly eight months had
>passed since the men from Srebrenica were killed, and none of the Serbs of
>Kamenica had thought to bury them. Tennis shoes and woolen socks still
>hugged skeletal feet. A stretcher made of a blanket and two wooden sticks
>lay on the ground; the wounded man who had lain on it was now an intact
>skeleton, still dressed in jeans and a plaid shirt. Skulls, vertebrae,
arms,
>legs, rib cages, rubber boots, bits of clothing, and ID cards were
>everywhere. And, in a thorny bush at the bottom of the hill, we found an
old
>Polaroid of four men--all presumably victims--laughing and sharing a
bottle
>of beer.
>
>As we walked among the dead, two Serb farmers drove past us on a tractor,
>the tires of their vehicle narrowly missing a corpse that still lay right
in
>the path. They seemed not to notice. A few minutes later, two more young
>Serb men walked by. I asked them if they knew what had happened on the
hill.
>They shrugged their shoulders and told us that they had been on vacation
in
>Austria during the summer of 1995.
>
>Ever since that encounter, I have been struggling to understand what these
>men could have been thinking. Even before the current slaughter in Kosovo,
>Serb forces had killed a massive number of civilians in the name of
national
>self-defense. Yet it has all gone on with barely a murmur of public
dissent
>or protest. Even when I approach Serbs individually, probing them for
>remorse, I hardly find any. Why not?
>
>Today, this could be the most important question facing the nato allies as
>they attempt to deal with the Serbian rampage through Kosovo. The
>conventional thinking among many Western intellectuals and politicians is,
>as President Clinton has put it, that we have no quarrel with the Serbian
>people. It is their leader, Slobodan Milosevic, and his henchmen who
>manipulated them into waging so many brutal wars. This is the thinking
>behind Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's two broadcasts to Serbs in
>their own language, which she learned during a brief childhood stay in the
>Yugoslav capital. And, if it is true, then it suggests a strategy aimed at
>breaking Milosevic's will or, at most, toppling him from power. To use the
>parlance of military strategists, the "center of gravity" in the war with
>Yugoslavia consists of the government and its armed forces.
>
>But what if it isn't true? What if the Serbs who wear targets on their t-
>shirts and gather in morbid celebration for daily rock concerts or
marathon
>races actually support ethnic cleansing--actively or passively? In that
>case, we do have a quarrel with the Serbian people. In that case, the
>"center of gravity" in Yugoslavia is something far more difficult to
destroy
>than an army or a regime. It is the very mentality of a nation.
>
>I myself used to believe that ordinary Serbs had been deceived and bullied
i
>nto accepting the atrocities done in their name. But now, after five years
>of covering events in the former Yugoslavia, and after trying in vain to
>elicit expressions of remorse from the hundreds of Serbs I have met, I am
>convinced that the latter assessment is the accurate one. Whatever else we
>do in Kosovo, we must face the fact that, for all intents and purposes,
many
>ordinary Serbs are--to paraphrase Daniel Jonah Goldhagen--Milosevic's
>willing executioners.
>
>The regime's propaganda, though powerful, can account for only so much of
>the Serbian behavior we have witnessed since Yugoslavia's disintegration
in
>1991. Consider a conversation I had on a sweltering afternoon in late July
>1996, when I went to Kravica, another Serb village near Srebrenica. There,
>forensic scientists from the U.S.-based group Physicians for Human Rights,
>accompanied by nato peacekeeping troops, were excavating a suspected mass
>grave. The scientists gently probed the earth in search of human flesh and
>began removing dirt, layer by layer. As they got closer to the corpses,
the
>stench of decomposing flesh became stronger. By the time they exposed the
>dozens of bodies, the stench was unbearable. The bodies had their hands
tied
>behind their backs with wire and had been executed at close range.
>
>A family of Serb refugees from Sarajevo had been resettled in a farmhouse
>right next to this mass grave. I found the head of the family, 68-year-old
>Pavle (he wouldn't give me his last name), picking apples about 50 yards
>away. When I asked him about the mass grave, his first reply was: "Those
>bodies are probably Serbs. Six Serbs are missing from this area." When I
>told Pavle that more than 7,000 Muslim men went missing after the fall of
>Srebrenica, he told me, "The Muslims probably killed each other." Pavle
went
>on to explain that the Muslims had quarreled about what to do when the
Serbs
>attacked Srebrenica. Some had wanted to fight and some had wanted to
>surrender. Eventually, these two groups started fighting and killed one
>another off.
>
>Both of Pavle's stories--that the victims were really Serbs or that the
>Muslims had massacred themselves--could have easily come from Belgrade
>television, which had retailed similar exculpatory yarns throughout the
wars
>in Croatia and Bosnia. Yet it's hard to imagine he really believed either
>tale. That became clear when I pressed him on the Muslim shootout version.
>If the Muslims had killed one another in gun battles, I asked, how come
the
>corpses' arms were tied behind their backs with wire? "How should I know?"
>he shot back. "And why should I care about recovering those who forced us
to
>leave our homes? The international workers would be more useful fixing our
>house than digging up those bodies."
>
>Obviously Pavle knew the truth. Just as obviously, his true sentiment
about
>the fact that so many Muslims had been slaughtered was: "They asked for
it."
>After all, the Muslim-led government had, he believed, forced him out of
his
>own house in Sarajevo. I have had many, many such conversations. Sooner or
>later, ordinary Serbs stop denying and begin arguing that the massacres by
>their forces were justified. Milosevic's propaganda is not really intended
>to create a new belief system among its audience; its true purpose is to
>arouse and reinforce a belief system that already exists, just below the
>surface of the Serbian personality. And central to this mindset is the
>notion that the Serbs, and only the Serbs, are the true victims in the
>Balkans.
>
>This belief system, to be sure, is based partly in reality, both
historical
>and contemporary. Serbs suffered terribly at the hands of the Germans and
>their allies during both world wars. And, in the conflicts since
>Yugoslavia's breakup, it is true that both the Croats and Muslims
committed
>their share of atrocities against Serb civilians. In fact, the Srebrenica
>enclave was the base for raids by Muslim guerrillas that killed hundreds
of
>Serb peasants. "In the twisted minds of us Serbs, knowing that what we are
>trying to do is right is enough justification to close our eyes to
>brutality," a Belgrade friend of mine once explained to me.
>
>Yet even this doesn't quite wash, because no rational consideration of the
>facts could produce the conclusion that the current abuses against the
Serbs
>(let alone those of the past) could constitute moral authorization for the
>far larger slaughter the heavily armed Serb forces are now perpetrating.
>This is where myth enters the picture. Serbian culture itself is built
>around elaborate sagas of failure and betrayal, all beginning with the
1389
>defeat of Prince Lazar by the Ottoman Turks on the battlefields of
Kosovo--a
>heroic last stand that sanctified Kosovo for all Serbs for all time. For
>centuries, Serbs have been taught not only that they sacrificed more than
>any other Christian European people to resist pagan aggression, but also
>that their sacrifices have never been appreciated or recognized. Rather,
>outside powers ungratefully denied them their independence.
>
>It is this deep-rooted historical sense of frustration and grievance that
>makes Serbs feel that they are, by definition, victims. And the Serbs'
sense
>of their own collective innocence is mirrored by an equally intense sense
of
>the collective guilt of the other Balkan ethnicities. In the grand sweep
of
>history, today's deaths of Muslims or Albanians (yesteryear's allies of
the
>Turks and Germans) are still nothing compared to the repeated "genocide"
>against the Serbs in the past. Thus, if the Muslims of Srebrenica were
>massacred, that is an appropriate form of retribution for what the Muslims
>of Sarajevo did to Pavle and his family. Cosmic payback.
>
>Surely, though, Pavle is just a peasant, an uneducated man susceptible to
>sentimental stories and stirring folk music. Modern Serbs, those who live
in
>the big cities and have received an education, must be immune to such
>appeals. Well, not exactly. Indeed, as Michael Dobbs reported in the April
>19 Washington Post, many Belgraders have access to Western media accounts
of
>Serb atrocities against Albanians and dismiss them, reflexively, as "
>propaganda." And it was a famous 1986 memorandum by leading members of the
>Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the most distinguished institution
in
>Serbian intellectual life, that set off the Serbian nationalist movement
in
>post-Tito Yugoslavia. The document was a tendentious mishmash of demands
for
>recompense for the past sufferings of the Serbs at the hands of both
Tito's
>government and such rival nationalities as the Croats and Albanians (see
"A
>Final Solution," by Ryan Lizza, page 28).
>
>As hostile as the Serbs may feel toward Croats or Muslims (and vice
versa),
>the deepest and most authentic intergroup hatred in the former Yugoslavia
is
>between Serbs and Albanians. Serbian anti-Albanian prejudice is perfectly
>crude and yet perfectly respectable in Belgrade. And it extends through
all
>levels of society.
>
>In the summer of 1997, I attended a party in Belgrade at the home of a
>beautiful artist, who had spent most of her life in Sweden but had
recently
>returned to Belgrade, and her boyfriend, a talented graphic designer
working
>for Saatchi & Saatchi. Most of the guests were like the hosts--handsome,
>talented, university-educated, and well-traveled.
>
>I had recently been to Kosovo, where I had been looking into what was then
>an obscure group of rural militants who called themselves the Kosovo
>Liberation Army. At the party, I met a Swedish diplomat who had also just
>returned from Kosovo. We quickly realized that we had met some of the same
>people and gone to the same bars in Pristina. As we recounted the good
times
>we had with the Albanians we knew in common, many of the well-bred Serbs
in
>the room started laughing. They thought we were joking. Surely, we hadn't
>really gone out for a beer with Albanians. As it gradually dawned on them
>that we were serious, the room fell silent, and, one by one, everyone
left.
>I assumed that they were bored with us or that they didn't speak English.
I
>learned later, from an appalled Serb who has since left the country, that
>the other partygoers had gone into another room to express their dismay
that
>the two foreigners had been associating with Albanians.
>
>There are, of course, "good Serbs," educated and considerate people who
know
>the truth and wish that they could act on it. Any number of Bosnian
Muslims
>owe their lives to such people, who risked all to spirit them out of
Bosnia
>just ahead of Milosevic's ethnic-cleansing machine. I asked one such
>Belgrade Serb how it was possible that so many Serbs could walk past the
>empty shells of houses, see piles of rubble that were once mosques, even
>step over the skeletons of the dead without showing remorse or any emotion
>at all. She was quiet for a moment, seemingly genuine in her anguish. "I
>feel terrible when I see the images of Albanians being forced into
Albania,"
>she told me. "Believe me, there are many others who do, too. Not all the
>good Serbs have left, as many believe. We are still here, desperate and
>horrified. We are silent, but we are documenting this Serbian madness."
>
>She asked that I not use her name or otherwise identify her for fear that
>she would suffer reprisals. My friends in Belgrade tell me it is
impossible
>to protest the atrocities of the regime, especially in a state of war--and
>Yugoslavia has been more or less permanently at war since 1991.
>
>This view, too, has a rational basis. Back in 1992, as the war in Bosnia
was
>just getting under way, Serbian peace activists marched through Belgrade
in
>opposition but were brutally silenced. They made another effort in 1993,
>but, again, a violent crackdown ended the protest quickly. Now, since nato
>started bombing Serbia, they say things are worse than ever before. "To
show
>remorse now would be suicide," explained my friend, pointing to the April
11
>assassination of Slavko Curuvija, the Belgrade publisher who had been
>critical of Milosevic's policies. He was gunned down just days after the
>official press had branded him a supporter of nato's bombing.
>
>Even so, fear of repression doesn't quite excuse or account for the
>ineffectuality of the good Serbs. After all, Serbian military and police
>began shelling Albanian villages and killing Albanian civilians more than
a
>year ago. How is it that the good Serbs could not find it within
themselves
>to protest the war on Kosovo's Albanians long before nato got involved?
>
>Furthermore, democratic-minded Serbs have, in other circumstances, showed
>that they are not afraid to take on the regime. There was actually a brief
>moment when I thought Milosevic's day of reckoning had finally come. It
was
>December 1996, a year after the war in Bosnia had ended. Tens of thousands
>of Serbs took to the streets of Belgrade demanding that Milosevic resign.
In
>Belgrade's beautiful old town, I stood amid throngs of protesters in
>Republic Square. They were students and workers, elderly men and women and
>families. They carried whistles and placards, banged pots and pans. Their
>mood was joyous and defiant--caught up in it, I, too, could hardly contain
>my excitement at the prospect that Milosevic would soon be gone.
>
>Their ostensible reason for marching was that Milosevic had overturned
>election results in several cities, including Belgrade, where opposition
>mayors and other city officials had been elected. But surely, I told
myself,
>the Serbs had finally found their soul and were also moved by their
leader's
>role in the siege of Sarajevo, the leveling of Vukovar, and the massacre
at
>Srebrenica.
>
>The Serbs carried on with their protests against Milosevic for 90 days
>through sleet and snow and subzero temperatures, every day, without
>exception. In so doing, they disproved the contention that the Serbian
>people were mere putty in the hands of state television's propaganda.
>Milosevic's TV tried to label the tens of thousands of demonstrators a
small
>group of terrorists and hooligans, but speakers at the rallies ridiculed
>this as the primitive propaganda it was. Indeed, as the protests went on,
>one of the movement's demands became that Milosevic give up his television
>monopoly because the public was sick of the lies and propaganda.
>
>As for the fear factor, scores of demonstrators were beaten and imprisoned
>by police, but the movement continued undeterred. The three months of
>protest ended peacefully, with a partial victory for the demonstrators:
>Milosevic ceded some power and positions to his opponents.
>
>These demonstrations constituted one of the most impressive displays of
>civic resolve I've ever seen. I was wrong, though, to imagine that they
had
>anything to do with the regime's crimes in Bosnia. At no time did
Belgrade's
>democratic movement ever add the war crimes in Bosnia to its list of
>complaints against Milosevic. To do so, in fact, would have divided the
>opposition (which contained ultranationalist elements itself) and
alienated
>the public.
>
>Serbia is not Nazi Germany; Slobodan Milosevic is not Adolf Hitler; and
the
>Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians, whose own irregular forces have
>killed Serbs hors de combat, are not exactly as helpless or as blameless
as
>the European Jews were. Still, the relative absence of effective Serbian
>protest and, especially, the silence of intellectuals on the matter of war
>crimes raise disturbing questions about the culpability of Serbs as a
whole
>in the actions of the authoritarian government that rules them.
>
>The very notion of collective guilt is uncomfortable. The whole concept of
>an international war crimes tribunal is appropriately based on the
>assumption that individuals, not whole societies, are to be held
accountable
>when atrocities such as those we have witnessed in the Balkans this decade
>occur. And yet what is striking about the ethnic cleansing by today's
Serbs
>is the same thing that struck Daniel Jonah Goldhagen as he reviewed the
>conduct of ordinary Germans toward the Jews during the Holocaust. It's not
>only the utter lack of sustained or substantial protest against it; it's
>also the gratuitous sadism--the "volunteerism, enthusiasm, and cruelty in
>performing their assigned and self-appointed tasks" (to use Goldhagen's
>phrase)--that the Serbs, like the Germans during World War II, have
>exhibited. Albanians tell of being forced to chant "this is Serbia" as
they
>were driven from their Kosovo homes, or to hold up three fingers in the
>Serbian salute. Kosovar Albanians have been systematically searched for
>jewelry and money; their homes, looted. Such things went on in Bosnia,
too.
>
>Perhaps the most telling detail of the Belgrade protests was the nature of
>the insults these Serbian pro-democracy marchers would hurl at Milosevic.
"
>Slobo is a Turk!" they would cry, a term that refers to Serbia's hated
>historical enemy, the Ottomans--but is also a common, modern-day slur
>usually aimed at Bosnian Muslims. "Slobo is an Ustasha!" they yelled,
>referring to the Croat fascists who allied themselves with the Nazis in
>World War II and killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs. And, when the
>busloads of heavily equipped riot police dispatched by Milosevic arrived
on
>the scene, the protesters' response was to suggest that the cops were
>focusing on the wrong target. "Go to Kosovo! Go to Kosovo!" they would
>scream.
>
>Stacy Sullivan is a consultant at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government's
>Human Rights Initiative at Harvard University. She covered the Balkans for
>Newsweek for two years and most recently wrote about Kosovo in The New
York
>Times Magazine.
>
>(Copyright 1999, The New Republic)
>

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